A. Advani and A. Summers (2022), IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities
Data
for the charts. Older versions at CAGE and IFS.
We discuss the measurement of top incomes and wealth in the UK, and options for reforming their taxation. First, we highlight the importance of capital gains and migration in understanding long-term trends in top income shares, and of survey under-coverage at the top in understanding top wealth shares. We next consider the scope for reforms to the taxation of capital to tackle these inequalities, whilst also improving the efficiency of taxation, emphasising the roles of Capital Gains Tax, Inheritance Tax and Wealth Taxes. Finally, we examine the question of who is taxed, including the tax treatment of highly mobile individuals and of trusts.
This short note summarises some key facts about non-doms, and explains the case for
reform to the current regime. It first explains briefly what it means to be a non-dom,
the tax advantages this can bring, the costs associated with use of these tax benefits,
and past reforms to the regime. It then provides some key statistics on non-doms in the
UK. Finally, we explain why the regime is in need of reform.
This CAGE Policy Briefing studies the offshore income and capital gains of the
UK's ‘non-doms’ – individuals who are resident in the UK but who claim on their
tax return that their permanent home (‘domicile’) is abroad. We use de-identified
confidential data accessed via HMRC to analyse all individuals who have claimed
non-dom status between 1997 and 2018. We show non-doms at least £10.9 billion
in offshore income and gains. Most of these unreported income and gains (55%)
belong to non-doms who arrived in the UK in the past five years. Looking at
previous reforms that restricted access to the non-dom regime, we see these led to
very little emigration. Those who did leave were paying hardly any tax.
Consequently, abolishing the non-dom regime would raise at least £3.2 billion even
after accounting for migration and other tax planning, and the loss of existing
revenue from the remittance basis charge.
Using administrative data on the universe of UK taxpayers, we
study the contribution of migrants to the rise in UK top incomes.
We show migrants are over-represented at the top of the income
distribution, with migrants twice as prevalent in the top 0.01%
as anywhere in the bottom 97%. These high incomes are
predominantly from labour, rather than capital, and migrants are
concentrated in only a handful of industries, predominantly finance.
Almost all (90%) of the observed growth in the UK top 1%
income share over the past 20 years has accrued to migrants.
We compare two approaches to measuring UK top income shares—the
share of income going to particular subgroups, such as the top
1%. We set out four criteria that an ideal top share series
should satisfy: (i) comparability between numerator and
denominator; (ii) comparability over time; (iii) international
comparability; and (iv) practical sustainability. Our preferred
approach meets three of these; by contrast the approach
currently used to produce UK fiscal income series meets none of
them. Changing to our preferred approach matters quantitatively:
the share of income going to the top 1% is 2 percentage points
higher, but rising more slowly, than under the alternative.
A. Advani, T. Ooms, and A. Summers (2022), Journal of Social Policy
Policymakers tend to ‘treasure what is measured’ and overlook
phenomena that are not. In an era of increased reliance on
administrative data, existing policies also often determine what
is measured in the first place. We analyse this two-way
interaction between measurement and policy in the context of the
investment incomes and capital gains that are missing from the
UK’s official income statistics. We show that these ‘missing
incomes’ change the picture of economic inequality over the past
decade, revealing rising top income shares during the period of
austerity. The underestimation of these forms of income in
official statistics has diverted attention from tax policies
that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest. We urge a
renewed focus on how policy affects and is affected by
measurement.
Top incomes have grown rapidly in recent decades and this growth
has sparked a debate about rising inequality in Western
societies. This column combines data from UK tax records with
new information on migrant status to show that that migrants are
highly represented at the top of the UK’s income distribution.
Indeed, migration can account for the majority of top-income
growth in the past two decades and can help explain why the UK
has experienced an outsized increase in top incomes.
A. Advani, H. Hughson and A. Summers (2023), Oxford Review of Economic Policy (invited)
Using anonymized administrative data on the population of UK taxpayers, we show that—in line with high-profile anecdotes about the tax affairs of the rich—effective average tax rates (EATRs) decline at the top of the distribution of income and capital gains. We also document substantial variation in EATRs within remuneration level: a quarter of those in the top 1 per cent pay headline rates, while another quarter pay at least 9pp less than the headline rate. Most of this effect is driven by the composition of remuneration, with investment income having lower tax rates and capital gains having lower rates still. If all individuals with income above £100,000 paid the headline rates, this would raise tax revenue on income and gains by £23 billion on a static basis, an increase of 27 per cent in the tax paid by this group.
This CAGE Policy Briefing summarises new research on the taxes
paid by the UK’s richest individuals, using anonymised data
collected from the personal tax returns of everyone who received
over £100,000 in total remuneration (taxable income plus taxable
capital gains). It shows how tax paid as a share of income or
total remuneration varies across individuals. It shows effective
tax rates are much lower than headline rates, regressive at high
levels of income or remuneration, and vary by up to a factor of
five across people with the same remuneration. An
Alternative Minimum Tax of 35% could raise around £11bn,
equivalent to 2p on the basic rate or 5p on both the higher and
additional rates.
This CAGE Policy Briefing summarises new research on the impact
of capital gains – which are excluded from existing income
statistics – on measured inequality in the UK. It shows gains
are highly concentrated, are persistent for a minority, and are
rising. The richest have a larger share of total resources than
previously thought, and it has been growing over time.
Capital gains (the profits from disposing of an asset for more
than it was worth when you acquired it) are generally excluded
from analysis of incomes in the UK, despite being a significant
driver of some people’s lifetime living standards. This
Resolution Foundation Report looks at what we know about taxable
capital gains; how our understanding of top income shares
changes if we include capital gains in our analysis; and whether
definitions of income used in official statistics should be
changed or supplemented.
Aggregate taxable capital gains in UK have tripled in past
decade. Using confidential administrative data on the universe
of UK taxpayers, we show that including gains changes the
picture of UK inequality over the past two decades. These
taxable gains are largely repackaged income, so their exclusion
biases the picture of inequality. Including them changes who is
at the top of the distribution, adding more business owners and
older people. The share of income plus gains (both pre- and
post-tax) going to the top 1% is 3pp higher than for
income only, and this gap has been steadily rising.
This CAGE Policy Briefing studies the individuals who make up the UK's
Sunday Times Rich List (STRL). These are the 1000 richest people or
families with strong ties to the UK. We link together information in the
STRL with multiple other data sources to analyse the foreign connections
of STRL members, the industries with which they are associated, and their
corporate ties to UK land and property. One in seven appear not to be UK
resident for tax purposes. Among billionaires, one in seven are located
in tax havens. Collectively they own almost £2 trillion in UK wealth.
This report presents the final findings of the Wealth Tax
Commission into whether the UK should have a wealth tax. It
concludes that if the government chooses to raise taxes in
response to COVID, it should implement a one-off wealth tax in
preference to increasing taxes on work or consumption.
A. Advani and A. Summers (2022), IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities
Data
for the charts. Older versions at CAGE and IFS.
We discuss the measurement of top incomes and wealth in the UK, and options for reforming their taxation. First, we highlight the importance of capital gains and migration in understanding long-term trends in top income shares, and of survey under-coverage at the top in understanding top wealth shares. We next consider the scope for reforms to the taxation of capital to tackle these inequalities, whilst also improving the efficiency of taxation, emphasising the roles of Capital Gains Tax, Inheritance Tax and Wealth Taxes. Finally, we examine the question of who is taxed, including the tax treatment of highly mobile individuals and of trusts.
The latest statistics on Household Total Wealth in Great Britain from the ONS are a welcome but limited insight into what has been happening to wealth in Great Britain. Limitations in survey response means they will underestimate the share of wealth at the top. While they will not tell us what has happened as a result of the pandemic, we can use them to provide an educated guess.
A. Advani, E. Chamberlain and A. Summers (2023), Tax Journal
A lively article in this journal asks the question 'Is now a sensible time to introduce a wealth tax in the UK?' (D Hanna, Tax Journal, 7 June 2023). Its subtitle contains the answer 'Not if
Norway is any guide.' The search for international examples is a natural one,
but it is also fraught with danger unless we try to understand the overall
policy context. We explain why the example of Norway is not a lesson about modest
tweaks to a wealth tax.
A. Advani, E. Chamberlain and A. Summers (2021), Tax Journal
A thoughtful analysis appeared in this journal of
our final report
on a wealth tax for the UK (‘The Wealth Tax Commission’s final report’
(P Barclay, G Price & T Schlee), Tax Journal, 8 January 2021).
For a full discussion of the final report, we would refer
readers to the
frequently asked questions
that deal with some of the misunderstandings that have emerged
and the
longer final report
(or for a quick read the
executive summary). However, we here respond to some specific points raised in
the article.
Household wealth is profoundly important for living standards.
We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has
increased slightly over the past decade as financial asset
prices increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data
deficiencies are a major barrier in understanding the true
distribution, composition and size of household wealth. We find
that the most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK
does a good job of capturing the vast majority of the wealth
distribution, but that nearly £800 billion of wealth held
by the very wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find
tentative evidence to suggest that survey measures of
high-wealth families undervalue their assets – our central
estimate of the true value of wealth held by households in the
UK is 5% higher than the survey data suggests.
In this paper we model the revenue that could be raised from an
annual and a one-off wealth tax of the design recommended by
Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020). We examine the distributional effects of the tax, both in
terms of wealth and other characteristics. We also estimate the
share of taxpayers who would face liquidity constraints in
meeting their tax liability. We find that an annual wealth tax
charging 0.18% on wealth above £500,000 could generate
£10 billion in revenue, before admin costs. Alternatively, a
one-off tax charging 4.8% (effectively 0.96% per
year, paid over a 5-year period) on wealth above the same
threshold, would generate £250 billion in revenue. To put our
revenue estimates into context, we present revenue estimates and
costings for some commonly-proposed reforms to the existing set
of taxes on capital.
This report introduces the UK Wealth Tax Commission, which will
evaluate whether a wealth tax for the UK would be desirable and
deliverable. To do this we have commissioned a series of
Evidence Papers that will study each of the key issues in
detail. In this report we set out initial evidence on what has
been happening to wealth and wealth taxation in the UK. We
examine the provisional case for a wealth tax, and map some of
the difficulties in implementing it. Our intention here is not
to provide the answers, but to illustrate the key issues this
project will address and set out the path to our final report in
December, which will contain our conclusions on whether or not
the UK should have a wealth tax, and if so, how it should be
designed.
Few UK policies have faced as turbulent a history over recent decades as Capital Gains Tax (CGT). The current CGT regime is the product of a series of contradictory reforms that have rendered the rules needlessly complex, inefficient, and unfair. Laying out a roadmap for much-need change, this report recommends a comprehensive package of CGT reforms going beyond changes to the tax rate. We use de-identified tax data accessed via His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to provide estimates of the revenue and distributional impacts of these recommendations. Importantly, our policy proposals include changes to the tax base that will shut down opportunities for tax avoidance and improve investment incentives and growth. We emphasise that these measures are essential alongside any increases in the tax rate in order for CGT reform to be effective.
A. Advani, H. Hughson, J. Inkley, A. Lonsdale and A. Summers (2024), CenTax Policy Briefing
Capital gains are currently taxed at much lower rates than income. This encourages individuals to work in a form that allows them to be paid in capital gains. While many small companies are highly productive, these personal service companies are typically not designed to ever grow. A negative side effect of low CGT rates is the proliferation of these businesses, which not only reduce the overall tax take, but hamper productivity by having people working in ways that are less efficient but are individually optimal because of the tax saving. We present new quantitative evidence that a large share of capital gains in the UK are, in fact, the returns to labour rather than capital. First, using a reform which aimed to make it harder to regularly pay out income as capital gains, we show at the individual level a large spike in company liquidations, as individuals attempted to benefit from CGT treatment one final time before the new rules were in place. Second, using de-identified administrative microdata from HMRC, we show at a macro level that over half of gains come from private business assets with annualised returns over 100%, suggestive that for many this money is not actually the return to capital, but to labour.
A. Advani, C. Poux and A. Summers (2024), CenTax Policy Briefing
The UK is unusual amongst international peers in not levying any tax on people who leave the country after making substantial capital gains whilst living here. We provide the first quantitative evidence on UK nationals who leave the UK after building a UK business, studying where they went and how much CGT revenue is potentially lost. We recommend that the UK should follow the approach of Australia and Canada by levying a ‘deemed disposal on departure’ (DDD) for people who leave the UK, accompanied by ‘rebasing on arrival’ (ROA) for people arriving in the UK.
Removing the harmful distortions created by the poor design of the UK’s CGT should be a key focus of policy. This chapter sets out how the tax base could be reformed to greatly reduce – and in some cases largely remove – the distortions to saving, investment and risk-taking. With a reformed tax base, tax rates could be increased with much less distortion to choices over whether, when or how to invest. We summarise a ‘big-picture solution’ that involves reforming the tax base while aligning overall marginal tax rates across all forms of gains and income. We also discuss steps that could be taken towards this end goal and who would win and lose from reforms.
This briefing presents new research on the distribution of capital gains and characteristics of taxpayers who receive them. It contributes to the debate on Capital Gain Tax (CGT) reform by outlining who would be most affected by changes to this tax. We investigate this question using de-identified, confidential data accessed via HMRC, which provides information on all individuals with taxable capital gains from 1997 to 2020.
We show that only 3% of adults paid CGT over the decade up to 2020. Most gains go to high income individuals, with almost half going to individuals earning above £150,000. More than half of all gains go to just 5000 people - 0.01% of the population - who receive £6.8m each on average. Gains are also geographically concentrated, with more gains in Kensington than all of Wales, and more gains in Hampstead than the entire North East. Notting Hill West - a neighbourhood of 6,400 people - received more in gains over a five year period than Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle combined.
The IFS Green Budget Chapter looks at the effects of inheritance tax reforms on tax revenue and distributional outcomes. We begin by setting out the status quo position for inheritance tax, and the likely trends in the absence of reform. We highlight a number of problems with the current form of inheritance tax, and make recommendations for reform. We then provide static costings for these reforms, as well as for increasing or decreasing the scope of the tax. This includes the possibility of abolition. Finally we study who would benefit from these reforms, by wealth level of the person leaving the inheritance, by region of the country, and for recipients by wealth level of their parent.
T. Pope, G. Tetlow and A. Advani, (2023), Institute for Government
A key tenet of good policy making is use of the best available evidence. Tax is an important policy area, and one where a wealth of evidence – quantitative and qualitative analysis, and broader intelligence and insights – is generated by researchers, practitioners and officials. This report documents how different types of evidence feed into tax policy making. By highlighting the role evidence plays, and which types of evidence have an impact at different stages of the process, we aim to help external stakeholders to understand how the evidence they produce is used and how they could better feed into policy making. We also provide recommendations for how government can further shift its approach, already improved in recent years, to enhance the quality of the evidence base and to use this more effectively.
This CAGE Policy Briefing studies the offshore income and capital gains of the
UK's ‘non-doms’ – individuals who are resident in the UK but who claim on their
tax return that their permanent home (‘domicile’) is abroad. We use de-identified
confidential data accessed via HMRC to analyse all individuals who have claimed
non-dom status between 1997 and 2018. We show non-doms at least £10.9 billion
in offshore income and gains. Most of these unreported income and gains (55%)
belong to non-doms who arrived in the UK in the past five years. Looking at
previous reforms that restricted access to the non-dom regime, we see these led to
very little emigration. Those who did leave were paying hardly any tax.
Consequently, abolishing the non-dom regime would raise at least £3.2 billion even
after accounting for migration and other tax planning, and the loss of existing
revenue from the remittance basis charge.
This CAGE Policy Briefing studies the UK's ‘non-doms’ – individuals who
are resident in the UK but who claim on their tax return that their permanent
home (‘domicile’) is abroad. We use de-identified confidential data accessed via
HMRC to analyse all individuals who have claimed non-dom status between 1997
and 2018. We show non-doms are globally connected and economically elite: almost
all were either born abroad or have lived abroad for substantial periods, and their
incomes are very high. Non-doms are highly likely to work in finance and other ‘City’
jobs. They tend to come from Western Europe, India and the US. Within the UK they
largely reside in and around London, although there are sizeable shares in Oxford and
Cambridge, working in research and education, and in Aberdeen, working in oil.
In this paper we show the importance of international ties amongst the UK’s global economic elite, by exploiting administrative data derived from tax records. We show how this data can be used to shed light on the kind of transnational dynamics which have long been hypothesised to be of major significance in the UK, but which have previously proved intractable to systematic study. Our work reveals the enduring and distinctive influence of long-term imperial forces, especially to the former ‘white settler’ ex-dominions which have been called the ‘anglosphere’. These are allied to more recent currents associated with European integration and the rise of Asian economic power. Here there are especially strong ties to the ‘old EU-6’ nations of France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. The incredible detail and universal coverage of our data means that we can study those at the very top with a level of granularity that would be impossible using traditional survey sources. We find compelling support for the public perception that non-doms are disproportionately highly affluent individuals who can be viewed as a part of a global elite. However, whilst there is some evidence for the stereotype of the global wealthy parking themselves in the UK, this underplays the significance of the working rich. Our analysis also reveals the remarkable concentration of non-doms in central areas of London.
A. Advani and A. Summers (2022), IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities
Data
for the charts. Older versions at CAGE and IFS.
We discuss the measurement of top incomes and wealth in the UK, and options for reforming their taxation. First, we highlight the importance of capital gains and migration in understanding long-term trends in top income shares, and of survey under-coverage at the top in understanding top wealth shares. We next consider the scope for reforms to the taxation of capital to tackle these inequalities, whilst also improving the efficiency of taxation, emphasising the roles of Capital Gains Tax, Inheritance Tax and Wealth Taxes. Finally, we examine the question of who is taxed, including the tax treatment of highly mobile individuals and of trusts.
Capital gains are particularly complex to tax given their
infrequency, the different ways in which they are generated, and
worries about harming productivity. There are theoretical
arguments in support of everything from zero rates to high rates
of tax on capital. In this paper, I first discuss the impact of
capital gains on inequality, which often motivates discussions
about how gains should be taxed. I then set out the principles
that determine how gains should be taxed, in particular how the
tax rate should relate to income tax rates. I propose that
capital gains tax rates be equalized with income tax rates,
subject to provisions to allow gains to be ‘smoothed’ over time
and to remove inflation from the tax base. I highlight key
transitional issues in moving to such a tax structure. Finally,
I discuss the specific lessons for Canada.
This CAGE Policy Briefing studies alternatives to the
government’s new Health and Social Care Levy. Using publicly
accessible tax data from HMRC, we find that removing the current
National Insurance exemptions for investment income and people
of pension age would raise £12 billion. This is the same amount
of revenue as the Government is targeting from its new Levy.
Equalising National Insurance on higher earnings with the rates
already paid by lower earners could raise an additional £20
billion. This would be enough to fund a cut in the main rate of
NICs by 1.25p, instead of raising these rates, as the government
is planning. Under this alternative package of reforms, more of
the revenue would come from London and the South East, and from
older, wealthier individuals.
This paper introduces a special issue on a Wealth Tax, which
draws together the latest thinking on wealth taxes with the aim
of filling this gap. It draws heavily on international
experience and evidence, applying these insights to the UK
context. The papers build on work undertaken for the Wealth Tax
Commission, which delivered its final report in December 2020.
The contributors to this special issue include tax practitioners
and academic lawyers as well as economists, reflecting our view
that this range of expertise is essential to evaluating the
practice, as well as principles, of a wealth tax. In this paper
we touch upon some common themes arising across the papers. We
also highlight some important remaining gaps in the evidence
base on wealth taxes, particularly on the measurement of wealth
and behavioural responses at the very top of the wealth
distribution.
In this paper we model the revenue that could be raised from an
annual and a one-off wealth tax of the design recommended by
Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020). We examine the distributional effects of the tax, both in
terms of wealth and other characteristics. We also estimate the
share of taxpayers who would face liquidity constraints in
meeting their tax liability. We find that an annual wealth tax
charging 0.18% on wealth above £500,000 could generate
£10 billion in revenue, before admin costs. Alternatively, a
one-off tax charging 4.8% (effectively 0.96% per
year, paid over a 5-year period) on wealth above the same
threshold, would generate £250 billion in revenue. To put our
revenue estimates into context, we present revenue estimates and
costings for some commonly-proposed reforms to the existing set
of taxes on capital.
In this paper, we review the existing empirical evidence on how
individuals respond to the incentives created by a net wealth
tax. Variation in the overall magnitude of behavioural responses
is substantial: estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth
vary by a factor of 800. We explore three key reasons for this
variation: tax design, context, and methodology. We then discuss
what is known about the importance of individual margins of
response and how these interact with policy choices. Finally, we
use our analysis to systematically narrow down and reconcile the
range of elasticity estimates. We argue that a well-designed
wealth tax would reduce the tax base (of reported wealth) by
7-17% if levied at a tax rate of 1%.
Aggregate taxable capital gains in UK have tripled in past
decade. Using confidential administrative data on the universe
of UK taxpayers, we show that including gains changes the
picture of UK inequality over the past two decades. These
taxable gains are largely repackaged income, so their exclusion
biases the picture of inequality. Including them changes who is
at the top of the distribution, adding more buiness owners and
older people. The share of income plus gains (both pre- and
post-tax) going to the top 1% is 3pp higher than for
income only, and this gap has been steadily rising.
The Register of Overseas Entities (ROE) was introduced by the government in Spring 2022 with the commitment that it would “require anonymous foreign owners of UK property to reveal their real identities”. We use data released by Companies House and HM Land Registry to assess to what extent the ROE is currently delivering on this aim. We identify and quantify several major ‘gaps’ in the scope and operation of the register and make recommendations for how the register could be improved.
A. Advani, W. Elming, and J. Shaw (forthcoming),
Review of Economics and Statistics
(earlier versions appeared as
CAGE Working Paper 414
and IFS Working Paper W17/24)
We study the effects of audits on long run compliance behaviour,
using a random audit program covering more than 53,000 tax
returns. We find that audits raise reported tax liabilities for
five years after audit, effects are longer lasting for more
stable sources of income, and only individuals found to have
made errors respond to audit. 60-65% of revenue from
audit comes from the change in reporting behaviour. Extending
the standard model of rational tax evasion, we show these
results are best explained by information revealed by audits
constraining future misreporting. Together these imply that more
resources should be devoted to audits, audit targeting should
account for reporting responses, and audit threat letters miss a
key benefit of audit
We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment
tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely
to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of
taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate
under-reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third
party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a
cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also
varies significantly with individual characteristics:
non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These
results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding
taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.
This IFS Briefing note uses data from HMRC’s random audit
programme to show which types of people are more likely to be
under-reporting taxes and how their behaviour changes after a
tax audit. The results are based on data from audits covering
tax returns for the years 1999–2009.
This SMF-CAGE Briefing Paper explains which types of individuals
are most likely to be non-compliant on their tax returns, and
what can be done to improve compliance and raise tax revenue.
Using administrative data on the globally connected super-rich in the UK, we study the effect of a large tax reform on migration behaviour. Prior to 2017, offshore investment returns for `non-doms' – individuals tax-resident in the UK but with connections to other countries – were untaxed. People making use of that tax status are strongly concentrated at the top of the income distribution: 86% are in the UK top 1% and 29% in the top 0.1% once overseas investment income is taken into account. A reform in 2017 brought long-stayers, who had been in the UK for at least 15 of the last 20 years, into the standard tax system, reducing their effective net-of-average-tax rate by 18%. We find that emigration responses were modest: our central estimate is that the emigration rate increases by 0.26 percentage points for a 1% decline in the net-of-tax rate, and we can rule out increases larger than 0.4 percentage points. Dispelling fears that the targeted taxpayers were able to circumvent the tax hike, we find large average increases in income reported and tax paid in the UK of more than 150%.
In this paper we study the contribution of migrants to the rise
in UK top incomes. Using administrative data on the universe of
UK taxpayers we show migrants are over-represented at the top of
the income distribution, with migrants twice as prevalent in the
top 0.1% as anywhere in the bottom 97% These high
incomes are predominantly from labour, rather than capital, and
migrants are concentrated in only a handful of industries,
predominantly finance. Almost all (85%) of the growth in
the UK top 1% income share over the past 20 years can be
attributed to migration.
Top incomes have grown rapidly in recent decades and this growth
has sparked a debate about rising inequality in Western
societies. This column combines data from UK tax records with
new information on migrant status to show that that migrants are
highly represented at the top of the UK’s income distribution.
Indeed, migration can account for the majority of top-income
growth in the past two decades and can help explain why the UK
has experienced an outsized increase in top incomes.
A. Advani, E. Ash, A. Boltachka, D. Cai, and I. Rasul (2024)
Issues of racial justice and economic inequalities across racial and ethnic groups have risen
to the top of public debate. Economists ability to contribute to these debates is based on the
body of race-related research. We study the volume and content of race-related research in
economics and examine the implicit incentives to produce such work. We do so for a corpus
of 225,000 economics publications from 1960 to 2020 to which we apply an algorithmic
approach to classify race-related work, and construct paths to publication for 22,000 NBER
and 10,000 CEPR working papers posted over the last few decades. We present three new
facts. First, since 1960 less than 2% of economics publications have been race-related, with
such work being balkanized into a few fields and largely absent from many others. There is an
uptick in such work in the mid 1990s. Among the top-5 journals this is driven by the AER,
QJE and the JPE. Econometrica and the REStud have each cumulatively published fewer
than 15 race-related articles since 1960. Second, on content, while over 50% of race-related
publications in the 1970s focused on Black individuals, by the 2010s this had fallen to 20%.
There has been a steady decline in the share of race-related research on discrimination since
the 1980s, with a rise in the share of studies on identity. Finally, irrespective of field, race-
related working papers do not have worse publication outcomes compared to non race-related
working papers, in terms of publication likelihood, quality of publication, publication lags
and citations. Hence conditional on working papers being produced, the publications process
provides little disincentive to work on race-related issues. We discuss policy implications
stemming from our findings on economists’ ability to contribute to debates on race and
ethnicity in the economy.
How does economics compare to other social sciences in its study
of issues related to race and ethnicity? We assess this using a
corpus of 500,000 academic publications in economics, political
science, and sociology. Using an algorithmic approach to
classify race-related publications, we document that economics
lags far behind the other disciplines in the volume and share of
race-related research, despite having higher absolute volumes of
research output. Since 1960, there have been 13,000 race-related
publications in sociology, 4,000 in political science, and 3,000
in economics. Since around 1970, the share of economics
publications that are race-related has hovered just below 2%
(although the share is higher in top-5 journals); in political
science the share has been around 4% since the mid-1990s, while
in sociology it has been above 6% since the 1960s and risen to
over 12% in the last decade. Finally, using survey data
collected from the Social Science Prediction Platform, we find
economists tend to overestimate the amount of race-related
research in all disciplines, but especially so in economics.
In the wake of last summer’s Black Lives Matter protests, many
have asked themselves what they are doing to tackle racial
injustice. For economists, one central question is the extent to
which the profession has examined the causes and consequences of
racial inequality. This column reports evidence that
race-related research in economic journals constitutes a far
lower share than in comparable publications in sociology and
political science. What’s more, economists over-estimate the
extent of race-related research done by the profession.
Understanding why economists produce so little race-related
research is essential if the discipline is going to be able to
reform.
Economists are central to policymaking in the UK, and to
providing the research that underpins that policymaking. Despite
having this important role in society, economists are not very
representative of society, with a well-documented
under-representation of women in the profession. In this
briefing note, we examine the ethnic diversity of academic
economists who provide much of the research that ultimately
feeds into policymaking. We use data from the Higher Education
Statistics Agency (HESA) to look at which groups are more or
less well represented as academic economic researchers. We then
examine economics students, to understand both the source of
current under-representation and the prospects for change.
Finally, we study some of the barriers faced by economics
students. We are not able to examine diversity among the large
number of economists who work outside academia, due to a lack of
data.
The future of UK economics is looking predominantly male and
disproportionately privately educated. This column introduces
#DiscoverEconomics – a campaign to increase diversity in
economics led by the Royal Economic Society and with the support
of a wide range of institutions involved in economic research,
communication and policymaking, including the Bank of England,
the Government Economic Service, the Society of Professional
Economists and many leading research institutions. The campaign
aims to attract more women, ethnic minority students, and
students from state schools and colleges to study the subject at
university.
The gender pay gap opens up immediately after graduation, with
male graduates earning 5% more than female graduates on average
at age 25. Ten years after graduation – before most graduates
start having children – the gender pay gap stands at 25%. Most
of the initial gap can be explained by university subject choices,
with women less likely to study subjects that lead to high-paying
jobs: women make up just a third of graduates in economics, the
subject with the highest financial returns, and two thirds of
graduates in creative arts, the subject with the lowest returns.
Subject choice continues contribute to the gender pay gap over
time, but its relative importance fades as other factors (like
having children and working part-time) come into play.
A. Advani, S. Sen and R. Warwick (2021), IFS Observation
The economics profession – and the current student population
studying economics – is not representative of society, with
women, some ethnic minorities, and state school students
underrepresented. While more than 7% of private school boys
doing an undergraduate degree were studying economics in
2018/19, less than 1% of state school girls were. We highlight
that interventions aimed at changing this picture need to
consider the choices students make early on in their educational
career. A Level Economics is a key gateway to further study in
the subject, but access to and take-up of this qualification
varies substantially according to a student’s background. As a
result, improving representation within the economics profession
in the long-term must include steps to ensure young students
understand what the subject involves and the opportunities it
provides, and have the chance to study it before university.
The future of UK economics is looking predominantly male and
disproportionately privately educated. This column introduces
#DiscoverEconomics – a campaign to increase diversity
in economics led by the Royal Economic Society and with the
support of a wide range of institutions involved in economic
research, communication and policymaking, including the Bank
of England, the Government Economic Service, the Society of
Professional Economists and many leading research
institutions. The campaign aims to attract more women, ethnic
minority students, and students from state schools and
colleges to study the subject at university.
A. Advani, D. Prinz, A. Smurra and R. Warwick (2021), IFS
Observation
Carbon pricing will be one of the most talked about policy
options at COP26. The idea of carbon pricing is that putting a
price on the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to reflect the
social costs of climate change should provide producers and
consumers with strong incentives to reduce such emissions. In
this observation, we consider the opportunities and risks from
introducing carbon taxes in developing countries, with reference
to Ethiopia and Ghana as case studies.
Current UK energy use policies, which primarily aim to reduce
carbon emissions, provide abatement incentives which vary by
user and fuel, creating inefficiency. Distributional concerns
are often given as a justification for the lower carbon price
faced by households, but there is little rationale for carbon
prices associated with the use of gas to be lower than those for
electricity. We consider reforms that raise carbon prices faced
by households, and reduce the variation in carbon prices across
gas and electricity use, improving the efficiency of emissions
reduction. We show that the revenue raised from this can be
recycled in a way that ameliorates some of the distributional
concerns. Whilst such recycling is not able to protect all
poorer households, existing policy also makes distributional
trade-offs, but does this in an opaque and inefficient way.
The report analyses and assesses: the rationale and objectives
of energy policy; the current policy landscape faced by UK
energy users; how current and future policy has led to
inconsistencies in the implicit carbon prices faced by different
users; and potential ways in which to improve policy affecting
domestic and business energy users.
Government wants both to reduce carbon emissions and to reduce
‘fuel poverty’. Energy prices have risen in part because of a
multitude of policies aimed at reducing emissions. There are
also multiple policies aimed at ameliorating these effects.
Altogether, this leads to a complex policy landscape,
inefficient pricing and opaque distributional effects.
In this report, we show the effects of energy price rises over
the recent past, look at what current policies mean for
effective carbon prices and their impact on bills, and consider
the distributional consequences of a more consistent approach to
carbon pricing, alongside possible changes to the tax and
benefit system that could mitigate these effects.
A. Advani, D. Prinz, A. Smurra and R. Warwick (2021), IFS
Observation
Carbon pricing will be one of the most talked about policy
options at COP26. The idea of carbon pricing is that putting a
price on the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to reflect the
social costs of climate change should provide producers and
consumers with strong incentives to reduce such emissions. In
this observation, we consider the opportunities and risks from
introducing carbon taxes in developing countries, with reference
to Ethiopia and Ghana as case studies.
Poor households regularly borrow and lend to smooth consumption,
yet we see much less borrowing for investment. This cannot be
explained by a lack of investment opportunities, nor by a lack
of resources available for investment. This paper provides a
novel explanation for this puzzle: informal risk sharing can
crowd out investment. I extend the canonical model of limited
commitment in risk-sharing networks to allow for lumpy
investment. The key insight is that the cost of losing insurance
is lower for a household that has invested, since it has an
additional stream of income. This limits its ability to credibly
promise future transfers, and so limits its ability to borrow
from other households. The key prediction of the model is a
non-linear relationship between total income and investment at
the network level – namely there is a network level poverty
trap. I test this prediction using a randomised control trial in
Bangladesh, that provided capital transfers to the poorest
households. The data covers 27,000 households from 1,400
villages, and contain information on risk-sharing networks,
income and investment. I exploit variation in the number of
program recipients in a network to identify the threshold level
of capital provision needed at the network level for the program
to move the network out of a poverty trap and generate further
investment. I also verify additional predictions of the model
and rule out alternative explanations. My results highlight how
capital transfer programs can be made more cost-effective by
targeting communities at the threshold of the aggregate poverty
trap.
A. Advani, T. Kitagawa and T. Słoczyński (2019),
Journal of Applied Econometrics
We consider two recent suggestions for how to perform an
empirically motivated Monte Carlo study to help select a
treatment effect estimator under unconfoundedness. We show
theoretically that neither is likely to be informative except
under restrictive conditions that are unlikely to be satisfied
in many contexts. To test empirical relevance, we also apply the
approaches to a real-world setting where estimator performance
is known. Both approaches are worse than random at selecting
estimators which minimise absolute bias. They are better when
selecting estimators that minimise mean squared error. However,
using a simple bootstrap is at least as good and often better.
For now researchers would be best advised to use a range of
estimators and compare estimates for robustness.
A. Advani and B. Malde (2018),
Journal of Economic Surveys
Understanding whether and how connections between agents
(networks) such as declared friendships in classrooms,
transactions between firms, and extended family connections,
influence their socio-economic outcomes has been a growing area
of research within economics. Early methods developed to
identify these social effects assumed that networks had
formed exogenously, and were perfectly observed, both of which
are unlikely to hold in practice. A more recent literature, both
within economics and in other disciplines, develops methods that
relax these assumptions. This paper reviews that literature. It
starts by providing a general econometric framework for linear
models of social effects, and illustrates how network
endogeneity and missing data on the network complicate
identification of social effects. Thereafter, it discusses
methods for overcoming the problems caused by endogenous
formation of networks. Finally, it outlines the stark
consequences of missing data on measures of the network, and
regression parameters, before describing potential solutions.
A. Advani and B. Malde (2018),
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (solicited)
In many contexts we may be interested in understanding whether
direct connections between agents, such as declared friendships
in a classroom or family links in a rural village, affect their
outcomes. In this paper we review the literature studying
econometric methods for the analysis of linear models of social
effects, a class that includes the `linear-in-means' local
average model, the local aggregate model, and models where
network statistics affect outcomes. We provide an overview of
the underlying theoretical models, before discussing conditions
for identification using observational and
experimental/quasi-experimental data.
In many contexts we may be interested in understanding whether
direct connections between agents, such as declared friendships
in a classroom or family links in a rural village, affect their
outcomes. In this paper we review the literature studying
econometric methods for the analyis of social networks. We begin
by providing a common framework for models of social effects, a
class that includes the ‘linear-in-means’ local average model,
the local aggregate model, and models where network statistics
affect outcomes. We discuss identification of these models using
both observational and experimental/quasi-experimental data. We
then discuss models of network formation, drawing on a range of
literatures to cover purely predictive models, reduced form
models, and structural models, including those with a strategic
element. Finally we discuss how one might collect data on
networks, and the measurement error issues caused by sampling of
networks, as well as measurement error more broadly.